The Risks of Using Secondary Liability Legislation as a Means of Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement by Land, Julie Erin
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 15 
Issue 1 Fall 2004 Article 6 
The Risks of Using Secondary Liability Legislation as a Means of 
Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement 
Julie Erin Land 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Julie E. Land, The Risks of Using Secondary Liability Legislation as a Means of Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement, 15 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 167 (2004) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol15/iss1/6 
This Legislative Updates is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized 
editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
THE RISKS OF USING SECONDARY LIABILITY
LEGISLATION AS A MEANS OF REDUCING
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a district-court holding that the providers of certain peer-
to-peer ("p2p") file-sharing software were not secondarily liable
for the copying and distribution of copyrighted sound recordings
and motion pictures by the users of their software.1 Applying a
test set forth by the Supreme Court twenty years ago, the Ninth
Circuit found that the software producers were not liable, because
their software was capable of substantial noninfringing uses in
addition to infringing uses.2
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) responded to this decision by
proposing Senate Bill 2560 - The Inducing Infringement of
Copyrights Act.3 This Act would give plaintiff copyright holders
an additional cause of action under secondary copyright liability.'
A plaintiff, under this Act, would have to establish only one
element - intent to induce infringement, which could be based on
1. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2004).
For the district court opinion see MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
2. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
3. S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). See Senator Orrin Hatch, Statement Before
the United States Senate on Introduction of the "Inducing Infringement of
Copyrights Act of 2004" S. 2560 (June 22, 2004) [hereinafter Hatch], available
at http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/floor.pdf (last visited March 29, 2005).
Senator Hatch expressed his belief that S. 2560 "will protect American artists,
children and taxpayers by restoring the privately funded civil remedy crippled
by the Grokster ruling." Id.
4. See S. 2560, supra note 3.
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surrounding circumstances.' Secondary liability could be
established from this element, regardless of whether the
defendant's product has substantial noninfringing uses and
regardless of whether the product promotes, rather than inhibits,
the progress of the sciences and useful arts.6
In this article, I will first discuss the history of secondary
copyright liability, focusing particularly on contributory
infringement and its application to traditional defendants, product
distributors, and Internet service providers ("ISPs"). I will also
briefly explain and discuss the relevance of secondary liability and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") safe-harbor
provisions. Next, I will explain Senate Bill 2560, Senator Hatch's
purposes in proposing it, the reaction to it by the technology
industries, and its potential implications. Finally, I will critique
the bill and voice my support for an alternative measure based on
public awareness and education.
II. BACKGROUND
Secondary liability for copyright infringement so far has been
based largely on case law rather than statute. The Copyright Act
of 1976 expressly imposes liability upon only direct infringers. 7 It
does not mention, on a general level, whether those who aid, abet,
induce, contribute to, encourage, participate in, or benefit from
those infringers may also be liable.8 However, courts have long
5. Id.
6. Id. The bill would be applied as a separate test. Id. Although it does not
replace the test in Sony, it disregards it by allowing contributory infringement
based on intent even when a plaintiff fails under the Sony test. See id.; Sony,
464 U.S. at 442. The bill is also inconsistent with the purpose of Copyright Law
set forth in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution,
which grants Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. See 17 U.S.C § 501 (2005).
8. Contributory infringement and vicarious liability doctrines have not been
codified. However, there are statutes addressing secondary liability with
reference to specific circumstances. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (2005)
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recognized secondary liability for copyright infringement in
certain circumstances.9 This liability has generally been imposed
under a theory of contributory infringement, vicarious liability, or
both. Under both of these theories, the secondary infringer cannot
be held liable unless there is a showing of direct infringement by
someone.1 ° Therefore, contribution to conduct that is held to be
fair use, for example, does not risk secondary copyright liability."
Although some courts use the terms "contributory infringement"
and "vicarious liability" fluidly or even interchangeably, 2 they
represent two distinct doctrines in copyright law. 3 When the
doctrines are applied appropriately, a defendant can be held liable
under one or the other, or both, depending on the specific facts. 4
(making it unlawful to traffic in devices that facilitate the circumvention of
technological measures that control access to a work or protect the rights of a
copyright owner); 17 U.S.C. §1002 (2005) (requiring that digital audio
recording devices contain the Serial Copy Management System, which
precludes digital-to-digital copies of copies, and prohibiting trafficking in
devices that facilitate circumvention of the Serial Copy Management System).
9. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 ("Vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all
areas of law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of
the broader problem of identifying circumstances in which it is just to hold one
individually accountable for the actions of another").
10. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 928, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding that the plaintiff Sega "must first establish that the users [of the
defendant's BBS] directly infringed Sega's copyright" to impose liability for
contributory infringement); Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164 (listing "direct
infringement by a primary party" as an element of vicarious liability for
copyright infringement).
11. See, e.g., Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 934 ("If the users' actions constitute fair
use, they will not be considered direct infringers. Then Sherman [the defendant]
cannot be contributorily liable because contributory infringement requires direct
infringement by someone").
12. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 437 (using "vicarious liability" and
"contributory infringement" in the same sentence to refer to the same concept).
13. See 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright §§
12.04[A][1] (2004). ("The boundaries between [contributory infringement and
vicarious liability] are often fluid. Nonetheless, the distinction between them
should be drawn when possible").
14. See, e.g., RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d
773, 777-79, 780 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendant was not a
2004] 169
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A. Contributory Infringement
Contributory copyright infringement generally falls into one of
two categories: personal conduct that furthers specific
infringement, or the creation and distribution of a product or
service that provides the means for infringement.15 Cases in the
latter category have generally involved new innovations in
technology that enhance the ability of the public to infringe and
that may or may not have other legitimate functions. These cases
have traditionally involved copying equipment, such as the video-
tape recorder ("VTR"), mechanisms for copying audio cassettes or
video games, and the MP3 player. More recently, cases in this
category have also involved services that allow for the posting or
exchanging of information to the public, such as electronic bulletin
boards ("BBS") and p2p file-sharing services.
Because innovations in the copying and exchanging of music,
films, photographs, and information have escalated in the past
twenty years, most cases in the product category are fairly recent.
The precedent relied upon for cases in the product category,
therefore, often deals with conduct in the traditional category. 6
The alleged contributory infringers in product cases had a distant
relationship with a large group of direct infringers from the general
public' 7 rather than a more personal relationship with a specific
contributory infringer but was vicariously liable); Ellison v. Robertson, 357
F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an internet service provider was
not vicariously liable, but holding that fact issues existed as to whether it was
liable for contributory infringement).
15. A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright §§
12.04[A][2] & [A][2][b] (2000)).
16. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 438. The court in Sony compared the
manufacture and distribution of a Betamax video tape recorder (VTR) to the
ownership of a chain store in which the employees sold bootleg records and the
management of infringing performance artists. Id. (citing Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2nd Cir. 1963); Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2nd Cir. 1971)).
17. See generally id.; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (involving the
[Vol. XV: 167
4
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol15/iss1/6
SECONDARY LIABILITY LEGISLATION
direct infringer.18 Applying contributory infringement to those
cases therefore required an expansion and adjustment of the
precedent.
Regardless of the category of conduct, the basic elements for
contributory infringement are the same. Liability for contributory
infringement is established where the defendant, "with knowledge
of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another."19 This test is broken down
into two prongs: the knowledge prong, and the participation prong.
To meet the knowledge prong, the defendant must have either
actual knowledge or reason to know of the infringing conduct."
This standard is applied objectively.2" Willful blindness, or
actively avoiding the discovery of infringement, constitutes
knowledge because the defendant has reason to know of the
operation of a bulletin board service on which the public could post infringing
material); Nintendo of Am. Inc. v. Computer & Entm't, Inc., No. C96-0187,
1996 WL 511619 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 1996) (involving the sale of videogame
duplication devices to the general public); Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (involving
the facilitation of digital file swapping between members of the general public).
18. See generally Shapiro, 316 F.2d 304; Gershwin, 443 F.2d 1159;
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving
the operation of a swap meet at which vendors were selling bootleg records).
19. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (formulating the test to apply to the manager
of infringing concert artists), cited in Netcom, 907 F. Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (applying the test to an internet service provider, which provided the
means for users to post material through a Usenet newsgroup); Cherry Auction,
76 F.3d 259 (applying the test to the organizer of a swap meet where vendors
sold bootleg records); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F.
Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (applying the test to a computer bulletin board
system's operators when copyrighted adult photographs were posted); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Cyberet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(applying the test to an internet age verification service, the subscribers of which
posted copyrighted adult images on their websites).
20. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162, cited in Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375
(holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the knowledge element
where the defendant internet service provider received notice from the plaintiff
of infringing photographs on the defendant's Usenet newsgroup and where the
works complained of contained copyright notices within them).
21. Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp at 1169.
2004]
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conduct.22
The second prong, the participation prong, is a totality of the
circumstances test, applied on a case-by-case basis.23 The degree
of participation or contribution that is required to meet the test,
therefore, is often blurred. Some guidelines have been established,
but they also can be blurred, and often are. Many courts agree that
the degree of participation must be "substantial."24 This seemingly
strict guideline has been loosely applied, however. Merely
providing the site and facilities or other means for known
infringing activity has been held to be sufficient to establish the
participation prong.25  In Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 6 for
example, the court held that the operator of a swap meet
"materially contributed" to the sale of bootleg records by vendors
by providing the space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing,
and customers for the swap meet.27 Some courts have further
suggested that merely encouraging the infringement is sufficient.28
1. The Application of Contributory Infringement to the
Manufacture and Sale of Products Capable of Infringing
With the advent of new technologies, the courts are reweighing
22. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
23. See, e.g., Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d at 264. The court declined the
defendant swap meet operator's request that the court consider its rental of
space to the direct infringers on its face. Id. Instead, the court considered the
defendant's provision of space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and
customers and determined that the defendant's conduct, as a whole, "provide[d]
the environment and the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive," and
thus that the defendant substantially participated in the infringement. Id.
24. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1993), affid, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir.
1994); Demetriades v. Kaufman, 690 F. Supp. 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
25. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d at 264 (citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Napster, 239
F.3d at 1019.
6
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the interests of the copyright holders against those of the
manufacturers of the technology on a case-by-case, and more
particularly a technology-by-technology, basis. This requires
revisiting the purposes behind copyright law in general. Copyright
law stems from the United States Constitution, which grants
Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. '29 By
providing incentives for artists to create, copyright law aims to
benefit the public as a whole through the availability of arts.
Technologies that allow the public in general to infringe have
presented difficult issues for the courts in light of these policies."
If courts hold that such technologies do not constitute contributory
infringement, they may be depriving the artists of their incentives
and thus theoretically depriving the public of the arts. Conversely,
if courts hold the sale and distribution of technologies to be
contributory infringement, they risk suppressing the development
of science and technology and even the development of art through
these technologies, which is after all what the Constitution aims to
promote. Each new technology, therefore, requires a new
balancing of interests and risks.31
To respond to the policy issues raised by new technologies, the
courts have developed the "substantial noninfringing use" rule."
This rule provides that the sale or distribution of a product does
not constitute contributory infringement if the product is capable
of substantial noninfringing uses, even if it also is capable of
infringing uses.33
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 428-41 for a lengthy discussion of the purposes and
policies behind Copyright Law and the interests that must be balanced in setting
a test for determining contributory infringement by a product manufacturer. Id.
31. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (holding that contributory infringement
doctrine as it is applied to the provision of products "must strike a balance
between the copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective ... protection of
the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce).
32. See id. at 440.
33. Id. at 441 ("The sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles
2004]
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The landmark case applying the contributory infringement
doctrines to the provision of products and establishing the
substantial noninfringing use rule is Sony Corp. of Am.v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.4 In Sony, the defendant, Sony Corporation of
America, manufactured for sale the Betamax VTR, which allowed
users to record television programming for later viewing.35 The
Supreme Court held that Sony was not a contributory infringer,
even though purchasers of the VTR could potentially use it to
infringe the copyrights of television programs, and even though
the plaintiffs provided evidence in the form of surveys that such
infringement was occurring.36
The Court found that the uses of the Betamax VTR fell into
three categories: (1) recording a copyrighted television program
for later viewing; (2) creating a personal library of copyrighted
television programs; and (3) recording, for any purpose, non-
copyrighted material or material of which the copyright owners
consented to copying. 37  The Court held that, of the three
categories, only the second constituted infringement. It referred to
the first category as "time-shifting," because the user is merely
choosing a more convenient time to watch the program. It found
that the time of day a user chooses to watch a program does not
adversely affect the copyright owner and in some cases even
benefits the copyright owner by increasing the total viewer
audience. Holding this conduct to be infringing would stifle the
users' ability to watch the programming at convenient times and
would "frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the
portion of their audience that is available only through time-
shifting. '38 The Court therefore held that private, noncommercial
of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be
capable of substantial non-infringing uses").
34. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 446, discussed in Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 ("The [Sony] Court was
unwilling to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement effectuated by
[Vol. XV: 167
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time-shifting in the home constituted a noninfringing use.39 It also
found through a survey that, although a substantial number of
interviewees had accumulated a library of tapes, time-shifting was
the primary use of the VTR. The Court therefore held that,
because the VTR was capable of both infringing and substantial
noninfringing uses, its manufacturers were not secondarily liable
for copyright infringement of television programs by its users.4"
The principles set forth in Sony have been adapted and applied
to other forms of copying equipment. In Recording Industry
Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc.,4" the
Ninth Circuit held the transfer of music from a user's hard drive to
a portable MP3 player to be fair use because it is merely space-
shifting.4" Since space-shifting was the primary use of an MP3
player, the court denied the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary
injunction.43
In contrast, the court in Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Computer
and Entertainment, Inc.44 held that the sale of copying devices to
facilitate playing downloaded video games constituted
contributory infringement, because the device's only realistic
purpose was to "supplant the need to purchase genuine Nintendo
videogames."45
means of a new technology at the price of possibly denying noninfringing
consumers the benefit of the technology").
39. Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
40. Id.
41. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
42. Id. at 1078.
43. Id. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the manufacture and distribution of the
MP3 player under the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, which prohibits the
importation, manufacture, or distribution of "any digital audio recording
device.. .that does not conform to the Serial Copy Management System." Id. at
1075 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1)). The court found that the MP3 player
did not qualify as a digital audio recording device because its primary use was
space-shifting, not to make digital audio copied recordings. Id. at 1078.
44. No. C96-0187 WD, 1996 WL 511619 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
45. Id. at *3. The court admitted that it was technically possible to use the
device to modify game play, but it concluded that this was not a realistic use,
because a significantly less expensive device was available for that purpose. Id.
20041
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2. The Application of Contributory Infringement to Internet
Services
The most recent adaptation of these principles has occurred in
cases in which the defendant has provided a service allowing
members of the public to post or exchange information or files
among themselves over the Internet.46 These defendants include
ISPs that provide USENET access to their subscribers, operators
of electronic bulletin board services, and operators of p2p file-
sharing services."7 Because file-sharing services are relatively new
and their intricacies are continuously changing and developing, the
application of contributory infringement principles to operators
and providers has varied from case to case, depending on the
specific facts.48
The landmark case for applying contributory infringement to the
operator of an Internet file-sharing service is Religious Technology
46. See generally, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (involving the
operation of an electronic bulletin board on which copyrighted literature was
posted); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(involving the operation of an electronic bulletin board on which copyrighted
video games were posted); Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (involving the facilitation of
digital music swapping over the Internet).
47. USENET is a worldwide system of discussion groups, called
newsgroups, that are organized by topic. See Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1366
(citing DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 16 (1994)). It
has its own operators, but access to it is provided either directly through an ISP
or through an electronic bulletin board service (BBS), which a user subscribes
to. See id. ISPs and BBSs generally have the ability to select which
newsgroups its subscribers may have access to and to selectively block access
by any of its subscribers. See id. Almost anything can be posted on the
USENET, including music, movies, photographs, and text. It is not generally as
easy to use, however, as p2p file-sharing services. These file-sharing services
are decentralized, in that, with the use of the service, users can exchange files
directly, without having to post to a centralized location. See Grokster, 380
F.3d at 1158. The only function of the service is to locate and match the users.
See id.
48. See generally Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; Aimster, 334 F.3d 643; Grokster,
380 F.3d 1154.
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Center v. Netcom On-line Communication Services, Inc. 49 In
Netcom, a user of a BBS posted portions of the plaintiffs
copyrighted literary works to a discussion forum on the USENET
through the BBS.1° The plaintiff filed motions against both the
operator of the BBS and the ISP through which the BBS gained
access to the Internet." The court denied both defendants' motions
for judgment on the pleadings. 2 It held that a BBS operator would
not meet the knowledge prong if it could not reasonably verify a
claim of infringement on its service. 3 In this case, however, there
was a question as to whether defendants could have verified the
claim had they properly investigated it. 4 The defendants, after
receiving notice of the infringement, had not even looked at the
postings at issue.5 The court held that the participation prong of
the test was met, since "providing a service that allows for the
automatic distribution of all USENET postings, infringing and
noninfringing, goes well beyond renting a premise to an
infringer."56  It found that the defendants failed, despite their
ability, to "take simple measures to prevent further damage to
plaintiffs' copyrighted works."57
The court in Netcom applied the basic contributory infringement
test and the substantial noninfringing use rule from Sony to the
USENET context. It narrowed the substantial noninfringing use
rule, however, holding that, even where a service has both
infringing and substantial noninfringing uses, its operator must
take action to eliminate infringement of which it knows or has
reason to know in order to avoid a contributory infringement
49. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1374.
55. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374.
56. Id. at 1375. See Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 1492,
1496 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that the provision of a site and facilities for a
swap meet in which bootleg records were sold constituted "material
contribution").
57. Netcom, 907 F.Supp at 1375.
2004] 177
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3. The Application of Contributory Infringement to Peer-to-Peer
File Sharing: Napster and Aimster
The application of contributory infringement liability to p2p file-
sharing raises new questions. P2p users exchange files directly,
rather than posting them to a central location, as in a BBS. The
primary question, therefore, is whether p2p file-sharing should be
treated as a product, like the VTR in Sony, or as a service, like the
BBS in Netcom. If it is treated as a product, the analysis ends if
the product has substantial noninflinging uses. If it is treated as a
service, the precedent in Netcom must be followed, and the court
must additionally determine: (1) whether the defendant had
specific knowledge or reason to know of infringement; and (2)
whether the defendant took reasonable action to block or eliminate
the infringing materials. The need for this distinction was
explained further by the court in Aimster:
the provider of a service, unlike the seller of a
product, has a continuing relation with its
customers and therefore should be able to prevent,
or at least limit, their infringing copyright by
monitoring their use of the service and terminating
them when it is discovered that they are
58. For examples of cases applying this precedent, see Ellison v. Robertson,
357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying summary judgment for Internet service
provider which provided its subscribers access to a USENET newsgroup used
primarily to exchange unauthorized digital copies of works by famous authors,
had received notice of the infringement through a phone call from a subscriber,
and had failed to take action to eliminate the infringing material or block user
access to it); Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (holding that a magazine had a
strong likelihood of success on a contributory infringement claim against an
age-verification service, because the magazine had given notice of infringing
material on the website of one of its subscribers, and the service had the ability
but failed to eliminate the infringing material).
12
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infringing. 9
Three major cases have addressed this issue: A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc.,6" In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,6 and Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.62  The Napster
service allowed its users to exchange music in the form of MP3
files through the use of software provided by Napster.63 After
downloading the software free of charge, a user could make music
available to other users by logging on to Napster's server and
designating the files to be shared.' Users could then download the
music as long as the uploading user (the host) was still connected
to the Internet.65 Once a user downloaded a copy, it could then
become a host and share that copy with other users. 66 Napster
provided a search engine through which a user could type in a
specific song title and locate a copy that was available at that given
moment.67
This system was a hybrid between a BBS and a pure P2P service
with regard to the degree it was centralized. It was less centralized
than a BBS because users could not permanently post files to a
central location. As soon as the host logged off the Napster server,
that specific file was no longer available. 6' Napster was not
technically decentralized either, because it worked by connecting
clients (the users) through a central server (Napster).69 The server
communicated the uploading user's address to the downloading
user's computer, which the downloading user's computer would
59. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648.
60. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
61. 334 F.3d 643.
62. 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
63. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1010.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1012.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Due to the large number of users, however, multiple copies of any
popular song could usually be located at any given time. See Napster, 114 F.
Supp. 2d at 902.
69. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
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use to connect to the uploading user's computer and download a
copy of the file."0 P2p, in the purest sense of the term, does not
involve a server at all.7' Since Napster was not purely
decentralized, it was able to provide technical assistance and to
selectively control access to the server.7 2 However, Napster could
not actually erase infringing materials, as a BBS operator is able to
do, because the files were not posted to a central location.7 1 It
could only locate the infringing materials through its own search
function and block future access by the providing users.74 This
would not necessarily solve the problem, however, because
popular music was constantly reintroduced by different users.
The court in Napster found that the Napster system was likely at
least capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 75  However, the
court applied the precedent set in Netcom and held that the
plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of a
contributory infringement claim, even if substantial noninfringing
uses were found. 76  The court found that Napster had received
specific knowledge of infringement through complaints, and it had
failed to appropriately rid the system of the material.77 This was
sufficient to constitute contributory infringement under the Netcom
test." The court admitted that to hold a computer system liable for
contributory infringement "merely because the structure of the
system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material" would
violate Sony.79 However, it found that the facts in this case were
more similar to those in Netcom than to those in Sony, because
Napster had "actual knowledge that specific infringing material
70. Id. at 1012.
71. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158. The p2p distribution networks at issue
in Grokster, unlike Napster, allowed each user's computer to be both a server
and a client and therefore did not maintain a central server. Id.
72. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011, 1023.
73. See id. at 1011.
74. Id. at 1023.
75. Id. at 1021.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
79. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
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[was] available using the system," it "could block access to the
system by suppliers of the infringing material," and "it failed to
remove the material."8 The court therefore evaluated Napster as
providing a service, like the BBS in Netcom, rather than as a
product, like the VTR in Sony.
The Aimster system, like the Napster system, included a server
that provided service to clients, the users. Aimster hosted the
website, collected and organized information obtained by the
users, and matched host users with downloading users.81 Also like
the Napster system, the Aimster system did not actually make or
store the copies, but rather facilitated the exchange of copies
between users.82 Unlike the Napster system, however, Aimster
users could exchange files only while both were connected to a
chat room enabled by an instant-messaging service.83 The users
could designate specific "buddies" to chat and exchange files with,
or they could designate all users of the system as buddies, allowing
a user to chat and exchange files with anyone else connected.84 All
communications between buddies, including files swapped
between them, were encrypted.85  This encryption prevented
anyone else, including Aimster, from viewing what was said or
swapped between the buddies.86
The Aimster court, unlike the court in Napster, found that the
Aimster service was unlikely to facilitate any substantial
noninfringing uses.87 It admitted that the service was capable of
fair uses, such as the transfer of noncopyrighted works, but it held
that "the question is how probable they are," not merely whether
the product is capable of such uses.88 It found that Aimster had
"failed to produce any evidence that its service has ever been used
80. Id.
81. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
88. Id.
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for a noninfringing use, let alone evidence concerning the
frequency of such uses."89 The court held that this evidentiary
absence alone was sufficient for the plaintiff to prevail.9"
The court went further to hold that even if Aimster was capable
of noninfringing uses, it would still be held liable for contributory
infringement because it could have attempted to prevent the
infringing uses at little cost.9 This holding added an additional
factor to the Netcom test - the cost and burden to the defendant of
preventing infringement on its service. It held that the provider of
a service that has knowledge of specific infringing uses and the
ability to prevent its customers from infringing can still avoid
liability if it shows that "it would have been disproportionately
costly... to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing
uses."92
The court found that the knowledge prong was met, even though
the encryption in the service prevented Aimster from having actual
knowledge of specific infringement, because it exhibited willful
ignorance. 93 It held, "a service provider that would otherwise be a
contributory infringer does not obtain immunity by using
encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge...." 94 The court
found that Aimster would have had the ability to track and prevent
infringement if it had not allowed the encryption.95 The court
admitted that encryption against other users had a social benefit of
providing privacy.96 It concluded, however, that Aimster had
failed to show that there was any value to the encryption against
the service provider itself, and accordingly that removing the
encryption to prevent infringement would not have been
burdensome or costly for Aimster.97  Therefore, despite the
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650.
94. Id. at 651.
95. Id. at 653.
96. Id. at 650.
97. Id.
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encryption that prevented Aimster from having knowledge and
control over potential infringement, Aimster was still treated as a
service rather than a product. The service was found to be liable
for contributory infringement, regardless of whether it had
substantial noninfringing uses.
The Aimster court both narrowed and broadened the
contributory infringement doctrine. It narrowed it as applied to
services with substantial noninfringing uses by adding analysis of
the cost and burden of preventing infringement.98 It made it more
difficult for a service to qualify as a service with substantial
noninfringing uses, however, by making it a question of
probability, rather than mere capability, thus broadening the test.99
It further broadened the test by precluding the defense of lack of
knowledge where such ignorance was willful.' 0
4. The Application of Contributory Infringement to Completely
Decentralized Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing in Grokster
The most recent case on p2p file-sharing involved two software
distributors, Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc.' °
Grokster allows for swapping of MP3 music files, and StreamCast
allows for the swapping of motion picture files. Unlike Napster
and Aimster, Grokster and StreamCast (the software distributors)
do not function using a central server. 1 2 They merely distribute
the software." 3 Beyond that, they are not involved in locating and
matching users or indexing and facilitating the exchange of files."°
The StreamCast software offers purely decentralized p2p file-
sharing by making each user's computer a server or a client,
depending on whether it is uploading or downloading a file. 5
98. See id. at 648.
99. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
100. See id. at 650-5 1.
101. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154.
102. Id. at 1159.
103. Id. at 1158.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1159.
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Rather than searching a central index of all available files, each
user maintains its own index of files it wishes to make available
and broadcasts a request to the indices of other users when seeking
a specific file.' 6  The software facilitates this process. The
Grokster software is slightly different in that it designates specific
available computers in the network to be indexing servers, rather
than making every uploading user's computer a server."°7 These
indexing servers are called supernodes. The supernodes can
change from moment to moment, and any user's computer with
sufficient speed can be designated a supernode. Both Grokster and
StreamCast are completely decentralized p2p programs. The
plaintiff copyright owners found that ninety percent of the file
sharing using these programs is illegal, and the remaining ten
percent is either authorized or of non-copyrighted material.'08
Distinguishing Napster and Aimster, the court in Grokster found
that the software distributors were not liable under a theory of
contributory infringement.0 9  The court clearly defined the
following requirements that had been developing since Sony:
If the product at issue is not capable of substantial
or commercially significant noninfringing uses,
then the copyright owner need only show that the
defendant had constructive knowledge of the
infringement. On the other hand, if the product at
issue is capable of substantial or commercially
significant noninfringing uses, then the copyright
owner must demonstrate that the defendant had
reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files
and failed to act on that knowledge to prevent
infringement." '
In determining substantial noninfringing uses, the court rejected
106. Id.
107. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1159.
108. Id. at 1158.
109. Id. at 1162-63.
110. Id. at 1161.
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the proposition in Aimster that the probability of the uses must be a
consideration.111 The court in Grokster returned to the holding in
Sony that, "a product need only be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses."'1 12 The court agreed with the extension in
Netcom, Napster and Aimster that a defendant service provider that
has an ability to prevent infringement and knowledge of specific
infringing files, and that nevertheless fails to prevent infringement,
constitutes a contributory infringer, even if the service has
substantial noninfringing uses.'13  It emphasized that the
defendant's knowledge of specific infringing files must have
occurred at a time in which it had the ability to act on it. In other
words, once a defendant's product is found to have substantial
noninfringing uses, contributory infringement can only be found if
the plaintiffs gave the defendants notice of specific infringement,
and the defendants had the control and ability, at the time of the
notice, to prevent the infringement. 4 This requirement cannot be
met by an ability to control that existed before the notice, but that
no longer exists at the time of the notice."'5
In applying these standards to the software distributors, the court
first found that the software was capable of substantial
noninfringing commercially viable uses.'16 This was evidenced by
the copyright owners' admission that about ten percent of the file-
swapping was either authorized or of non-copyrighted works." 7
The court found that this translated into "hundreds of thousands of
legitimate file exchanges," which the court held to be significant."8
In the final part of the analysis, the court found that although the
plaintiffs had given the defendants notice of specific infringing
files, the notice was given too late for the defendants to respond to
111. Id. at 1162. See also Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
112. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162 (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021).
113. Id. at 1161. See also Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022, 1027 (citing Religious
Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1374-75).
114. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1162.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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it." 9  The defendants had already distributed the software, thus
they no longer had any control over what the consumers did with
it. 2°  Since the defendants did not have sufficient reasonable
knowledge of specific infringing files, the court did not apply the
Netcom test. Therefore, the court treated the software as a product,
like the VTR in Sony, rather than as a service, like the BBS in
Netcom and the file-sharing services in Napster and Aimster.'2 1
B. Vicarious Liability
The second form of secondary liability for copyright
infringement is vicarious liability. This concept was developed
from the agency principles of respondeat superior, which imposes
liability on an employer for the actions of an employee in the
course of his employment. The courts have extended this doctrine
in the area of copyright infringement to impose liability upon "a
defendant whose economic interests were intertwined with the
direct infringer's, but who did not actually employ the direct
infringer." '22 To maintain a cause of action for vicarious liability,
a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had (1) the right and
ability to control the infringing activity; and (2) a direct financial
interest in such activities. 23
119. Id.
120. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
121. Id. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. 1361;
Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; Aimster, 334 F.3d 643.
122. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein and Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
[O]ne of the principal rationales of vicarious liability, namely
the difficulty of obtaining effective relief against an
[employee], who is likely to be impecunious,... has been
extended in the copyright area to cases in which the only
effective relief is obtainable from someone who bears a
relation to the direct infringers that is analogous to the relation
of [an employer to an employee].
Id.
123. Gershwin Publ'g. v. Columbia Artists, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (citing Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307). See, e.g., RCA/Ariola Int'l., Inc. v.
20
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To explain the requirements, the court in Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co., Inc. v. H.L. Green Company, Inc. 24 compared the situation of
a landlord to that of a dance-hall operator. 125 A landlord who lacks
knowledge of infringing acts of its tenant and who exercises no
control over the leased premises is not liable for infringing sales by
its tenant." 6 On the other hand, the operator of an entertainment
venue is liable for the infringing performances if the operator can
control the premises and obtains a direct financial benefit from the
audience, who paid to enjoy the infringing performance. 27  The
court in Shapiro applied this logic to find the owner of a chain of
department stores vicariously liable for the counterfeit recordings
of one of its concessionaires. 28  It found that the relationship
between the store owner and the concessionaire was closer to the
dance-hall model than to the landlord-tenant model; the owner had
retained the ultimate right of supervision over the conduct of the
concessionaire and its employees, and it had reserved for itself a
proportionate share of the gross receipts from the concessionaire's
sales. 129 It therefore had both control over the infringement and a
direct financial benefit from it.'30
Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding a
manufacture of a specialized tape machine that allowed persons to record from
one cassette tape to another to be vicariously liable for copyright infringement
because of its issuance of directives to retailers, whose employees actually
helped customers violate copyright laws, its claim of policing the retailers, and
its profiting by tapes sales). But see Aitken, Hazen, Miller P.C. v. Empire
Constr Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 262 (D.C. Neb. 1982) (holding that a building
supply dealer and engineer, who approved building plans copied from plans
prepared by architects and engineers without notice of the source of the plans,
were not liable as vicarious infringers).
124. Shapiro, 316 F.2d 304.
125. Id. at 307.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 308.
129. Id.
130. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308.
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1. The Control Prong
To meet the control prong of the test, it is sufficient if the
defendant had the ability to police the conduct, even if it did not
actually do so.' In Shapiro, for example, the owner did not
actually supervise the infringing sales, and, furthermore, he did not
even know about them. 32 However, he still met the control
requirement; he had required the employees to observe all
regulations set by him, and he had reserved "unreviewable
discretion" to discharge them.'33
The control prong is also met if the defendant promoted or
induced the infringing acts.'34 In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.
Columbia Artists,'35 a manager of concert artists sponsored the
creation of local concert associations to provide audiences for its
artists, knowing that the artists included copyrighted compositions
in their performances without permission.'36 The court held that,
because the defendant promoted the infringing activity, he
sufficiently controlled it.137
2. The Direct Financial Benefit Prong
The defendant does not have to benefit through direct sales of
the infringing products to meet the direct financial benefit prong. 31
It is sufficient if the infringement enhances the attractiveness of
the defendant's business to potential customers. 139 For example, in
131. Id. See also Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261 (holding that the operator of a
swap meet where bootleg records were sold met the control prong, because he
"had the right to terminate vendors for any reason whatsoever and through that
right had the ability to control the activities of vendors on the premises").
132. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 306.
133. Id.
134. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1160.
137. Id. at 1163.
138. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263 (9th Cir. 1996).
139. Id. But see Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1110
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the test does not apply to parent corporations).
188
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Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., the court held that the sale
of pirated records at defendant's swap meet met the direct
financial benefit prong, because it was a draw for customers.
1 41
Although the requirements for vicarious liability and
contributory infringement are different and have produced
different outcomes in some cases, the theories have so far
produced parallel outcomes in p2p files-sharing cases. 41  In
Napster,1 42 the court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits under both theories. 43 It found
that, since Napster's future revenue was directly dependent upon
increases in its user base, and the infringing works likely enhanced
the attractiveness of the service, the plaintiffs were likely to
establish that Napster had a direct financial interest in the
infringing activity.'" In Aimster,'45 the court also found that the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed. 46 It held that, "by eliminating the
encryption feature and monitoring the use being made of its
system, Aimster could.. .have limited the amount of
infringement," which, it implied, could meet the control prong of
the vicarious liability test.'47  In Grokster,148 the court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendants on both counts. 49 It found
that the defendant software distributors did not have the ability to
block access to the individual users, thus they did not have the
supervisory relationship necessary to meet the control prong. 5°
140. Id.
141. See Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; Aimster, 334 F.3d 643; Grokster, 380 F.3d
1154.
142. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1023.
145. Aimster, 334 F.3d 643.
146. Id. at 653, 655.
147. Id. at 654. The court did not go into further analysis of vicarious
liability, because the defendants were appealing the grant of a preliminary
injunction, and the court had already affirmed it based on the contributory
infringement count. Id. at 655.
148. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154.
149. Id. at 1157.
150. Id. at 1165.
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Although the court did find that the direct financial relationship
prong was met, it concluded that the defendants were not vicarious
infringers, as both prongs were not met. 5' In all three cases, the
primary focus of the analysis was on the contributory infringement
claim, not the vicarious liability claim. Therefore, although the
theories have different elements, and there have been cases where
a defendant has been found to be liable under one theory and not
the other, 52 it can be assumed that the concepts are fairly fluid153,
especially in the p2p file-swapping context.
C. Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe Harbors
In 1998, Congress passed the DMCA, part of which limits the
relief available to copyright owners against an ISP where it
implemented a reasonable policy to prevent the use of its service
by repeat infringers.154 An ISP, as defined in the Act, is "a
provider of online services or network access, or the operator of
facilities therefore."'55 The conduct of a service provider must also
fall into one of four categories for the limitation to apply:
transitory digital network communications, system caching,
storage at the direction of the user of material on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or
linking users to an online location containing infringing material. 56
If an ISP qualifies, the DMCA will protect it "from liability for all
monetary relief for direct, vicarious, and contributory
151. Id.
152. See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1074 (holding that fact issues existed as to
whether an internet service provider was liable for contributory infringement,
but it was not liable under vicarious liability); RCA/Ariola, 845 F.2d at 777, 781
(holding that the defendant was not a contributory infringer, but it was
vicariously liable).
153. See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
§12.04[A] (admitting that "the boundaries between [the] two categories are
often fluid," but noting that "the distinction between them should be drawn
when possible").
154. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2005).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2005).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2005).
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infringement." '157 In essence, the DMCA ensures that a service
provider will not be held liable for the infringing conduct of its
users, where it is taking all reasonable action to track, control, and
stop infringement of which it receives notice.
The DMCA was enacted after Netcom'58 but before Napster,'59
Aimster,6° and Grokster.6' The court in Netcom required that a
service provider with knowledge of infringement take "simple
measures to prevent further damage to.. .copyrighted works,"
where it is able, to avoid contributory infringement.'62 The DMCA
safe harbor provisions, therefore, merely codify and clarify the
essential holding in Netcom' 63 Napster, Aimster, and Grokster did
not overturn Netcom, but merely built on it and applied it to
different technology and different facts. If anything, the DMCA
requires a more stringent prevention policy than the contributory
infringement doctrine."6 In the p2p file-sharing context, therefore,
if the contributory infringement doctrine is applied appropriately,
the DMCA safe-harbor provisions will not apply.
The holdings in Napster, Aimster, and Grokster, with regard to
157. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 40 (1998), quoted in Napster, 239 F.3d at
(holding that defendant's potential liability for contributory and vicarious
infringement did not render the DMCA inapplicable per se, but that plaintiffs
had raised serious questions as to whether the defendant qualified).
158. Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. 1361.
159. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
160. Aimster, 334 F.3d 643.
161. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154.
162. Netcom, 907 F.Supp at 1375.
163. See Ellison, 239 F.3d at 1081 ("Congress intended the relevant language
of § 512(a) to codify the result of Netcom ').
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (requiring that a service provider "has
adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account
holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for
the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders
of the service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers").
Compare with Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653 (implying that a service provider can
avoid a contributory infringement claim by establishing either that it takes
action to "eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses", that it
does not have the ability to take such action, or that "it would have been
disproportionately costly" to take such action).
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the application of safe harbors, are consistent with this reasoning.
The court in Napster, which held that the plaintiffs established a
likelihood of success on the merits of a contributory infringement
claim, found that the scales also tipped in the plaintiffs' favor
regarding the application of the DMCA safe harbors. 6 ' It found
that the plaintiffs had raised significant questions about its
application, including whether Napster had established and
implemented the requisite copyright compliance policy.'66 The
court in Aimster, which also found that the plaintiffs were likely to
prevail on a contributory infringement claim, held that the service
did not qualify under the safe-harbor provisions. It gave the
following explanation:
Far from doing anything to discourage repeat
infringers of the plaintiffs' copyrights, Aimster
invited them to do so, showed them how they could
do so with ease using its system, and by teaching its
users how to encrypt their unlawful distribution of
copyrighted materials disabled itself from doing
anything to prevent infringement. '6 7
This explanation exemplifies a court's mutually-exclusive
determination that a service does not meet the strict requirements
for DMCA safe harbors once the court has already determined that
the service failed to take the simple measures required to avoid a
contributory infringement claim. The court in Grokster did not
need to address the application of the safe-harbor provisions, since
it affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
contributory infringement and vicarious liability claims.'68 The
primary means for applying secondary liability to p2p file-sharing
software or services, therefore, is through contributory
infringement doctrine.
165. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
166. Id.
167. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 654.
168. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1157.
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III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The test applied to determine contributory infringement
currently varies depending on the defendant's conduct. Under the
traditional contributory infringement doctrine, not involving the
distribution of a product or service, a cause of action for
contributory infringement exists if the defendant had knowledge of
infringing activity and induced,, caused, or materially contributed
to it. 69 This test is still the basic structure of the contributory
infringement test. The analysis within this structure, however, has
been altered to adapt it to the distribution of products and services.
A plaintiff filing a claim against a product must establish (1) that
the product does not have substantial noninfringing uses and (2)
that the defendant has constructive knowledge of the
infringement. 7 ' This doctrine was established in Sony and has
remained largely unchanged.' It increased the difficulty of
establishing a contributory infringement action against a product
distributor than against a traditional contributory infringement
defendant.
A plaintiff filing a claim against a service also has a cause of
action if it establishes the aforementioned elements established in
Sony.172  Netcom suggested an additional test for services, 73
169. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at 1162.
170. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (holding that a VTR was not liable for
contributory infringement, because it had substantial noninfringing uses).
171. See, e.g., Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (holding that the distributors of file-
sharing software were not liable for contributory infringement, because the
software had substantial noninfringing uses, and it was a product, making it
impossible for the distributors to control infringement after its distribution).
172. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653. The Seventh Circuit held that the district
court was justified in holding that the recording industry (the plaintiff) was
likely to prevail based on the defendant p2p file-sharing service's failure "to
show that its service [had] ever been used for any purpose other than to infringe
the plaintiffs' copyrights." Id.
173. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1374-75. The court does not
clearly define the test, but it suggests it by holding that the electronic bulletin
board at issue was a contributor infringer, because it had "knowledge of
infringing postings" and the ability "to take simple measures to prevent further
2004]
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however, that was developed and applied in Napster1 74 and
Aimster.175 Under the most recent version of this test, if a plaintiff
claiming contributory infringement against a service fails to
establish the Sony elements, it may still have a cause of action by
establishing (1) the defendant had specific knowledge of
infringement, (2) it would not have been costly or burdensome for
it to eliminate or reduce further infringement, and (3) it failed to
take action toward such elimination or reduction.'76  Netcom,
Napster, and Aimster therefore made it easier to establish a
contributory infringement action against a service than against a
product.
In Grokster, the court treated the p2p file-sharing software at
issue as a product rather than as a service, because the defendants
did not maintain a central server as in Netcom, Napster, and
Aimster.77 This made it more difficult for the plaintiff to establish
[infringement]," yet it "continued to aid" in its accomplishment. Id.
174. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021. The court held that, even though Napster
was likely at least capable of substantial non-infringing uses, the plaintiff was
still likely to prevail, because Napster "had actual knowledge that specific
infringing material [was] available using its system ... it could block access to
the system by suppliers of the infringing material, and.., it failed to remove the
material." Id.
175. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
176. See id. The court held that the plaintiff was likely to prevail, even if
Aimster had substantial non-infringing uses, because Aimster had received
notice of the infringement, it had failed to reduce further infringement, and the
encryption which prevented it reducing infringement would not have been
costly to remove. Id.
177. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163. The court exhibited this distinction by
explaining "while material contribution can be established through provision of
site and facilities for infringement, followed by a failure to stop specific
instances of infringement once knowledge of those infringements is acquired,
the Software Distributors have not provided the site and facilities for
infringement in the first place." Id. (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (holding
that the operator of a swap meet where bootleg records were sold materially
contributed to the infringement, because he provided the site and facilities for
the infringement)). The court in Grokster distinguished the Aimster and Napster
services by analogizing them to the Cherry Auction swap meet operator,
because all of them were service providers that had the ability to control the
infringement at their "facilities." Id. The court suggested, however, that
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a cause of action. Applying the Sony test, the court found that the
defendant's product had substantial noninfringing uses.178 Because
defendants had no control over the software once it was distributed
and did not have reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files
before the software was distributed, the court ended the analysis
there. It treated the software as a product and therefore did not
give the plaintiff the further option of establishing a cause of
action under the Netcom test.'79 The defendants in Grokster
therefore defeated the cause of action under a pure Sony analysis.
A. Senator Hatch's Reaction to Grokster
Senator Hatch (R-UT), disturbed by the outcome in Grokster,
responded by proposing Senate Bill 2560, the Inducing
Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004.18° This bill would add an
additional test to every contributory infringement action,
regardless of whether the defendant was a traditional defendant or
the distributor of a product or service. This test would have one
element - intent to induce infringement. 8' The bill, if passed,
would add to the end of Section 501 of title 17, the following:
(g)(1) In this subsection, the term 'intentionally
induces' means intentionally aids, abets, induces, or
procures, and intent may be shown by acts from
which a reasonable person would find intent to
induce infringement based upon all relevant
information about such acts then reasonably
available to the actor, including whether the activity
relies on infringement for its commercial viability.
product distributors, unlike services providers, do not provide the site and
facilities sufficient to establish material contribution and that the Netcom test
need not be applied to products on that basis. Id.
178. Id. at 1162.
179. Id. at 1163.
180. See S. 2560, supra note 3. See also Hatch, supra note 3.
181. See S. 2560, supra note 3. See also Hatch, supra note 3.
2004)
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(2) Whoever intentionally induces any violation
identified in subsection (a) shall be liable as an
infringer.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall enlarge or
diminish the doctrines of vicarious and contributory
liability for copyright infringement or require any
court to unjustly withhold or impose any secondary
liability for copyright infringement. 182
The purpose of the bill, as stated by Senator Hatch, is to
"confirm that creative artists can sue corporations that profit by
encouraging.. .others to commit illegal or criminal acts of
copyright infringement.1 '8 3 Hatch expressed his concern that, as a
result of Grokster, distributors of p2p software will legally be able
to "profit by inducing children to steal," luring them "with false
promises of 'free music. '184
Hatch claimed that the courts in Napster'85 and Grokster'86
misinterpreted the substantial noninfringing use rule in Sony 187 by
placing too much focus on whether the defendant has the ability to
control infringement.'88 Hatch proposed instead that "secondary
liability should focus on intent to use indirect means to achieve
illegal ends."'' 89  Therefore, Senate Bill 2560 would add an
additional method for plaintiffs to impose secondary liability on
products, services, and traditional defendants. There would be
only one element in this test: intent to induce infringement.
182. S. 2560, supra note 3.
183. Hatch, supra note 3.
184. Id.
185. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
186. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154.
187. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (1984) ("[T]he sale of copying equipment, like
the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses").
188. Hatch, supra note 3.
189. Id.
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Secondary liability would be imposed if this element is met,
regardless of the extent of the defendant's contribution to the
infringement, and regardless of whether there is substantial
noninfringing use, knowledge of specific infringement, or ability
to control the infringement. In determining "intent to induce",
Hatch implied that courts should borrow from criminal intent.9 °
Hatch did suggest some limits to this test. First, the bill would
merely restore the secondary liability doctrine as it existed before
Grokster 9' Second, the savings clause in the bill would make the
law serve as guidance for the courts, "not an iron-clad rule of
decision for all possible future cases."'92 Hatch stressed the
importance of having flexibility to analyze the facts of each case.'93
Finally, Hatch expressed clearly his intent to preserve the holding
in Sony regarding "copies made and used within an individual's
home environment."'94 He reported the following:
this bill is about the intentional inducement of
global distribution of billions of infringing copies of
works at the prodding and instigation of
sophisticated corporations that appear to want to
profit from piracy.. .and try to shield themselves
from secondary liability by inducing others to
infringe and then disclaiming control over those
individuals. '
According to those who opposed it, however, the bill could have
implications on a much greater scale.
B. Reaction to the Bill
The bill was introduced on June 25, 2004 and was heard by the
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Hatch, supra, note 3.
195. Id.
2004] 197
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Senate Committee on the Judiciary on July 22, 2004. Following
the bill's introduction, individuals and organizations, especially
from the technical industries, expressed their opposition and
concern. 196  They feared that the broad law would apply to
unintended parties, such as manufacturers of products, and even
journalists, if their products and influence unintentionally induced
infringement. 9 7 Senator Hatch responded that he intended to move
ahead with the bill, but he invited criticism and suggestions.'98
In response to Hatch's invitation, associations, coalitions and
other groups joined in opposition to Senate Bill 2560 and
presented Senator Hatch and other sponsors of the bill with
suggestions and proposed drafts for an alternative version. 99 In
September, 2004, a discussion draft was proposed by the U.S.
Copyright Office. 200  This draft defined "induce" as committing
"one or more affirmative, overt acts that are reasonably expected
196. See, e.g., Senator wants to ban P2P networks, July 23, 2004, available
at http://techrepublic.com.com/5102-22-5281219.html (last visited March 29,
2005).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Group offers alternative to P2P bill, August 24, 2004, available at
http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/2004/08/group-offers-alternative-to-p2p-bill.h
tml (last visited March 29, 2005). These drafts propose that the predominant
use of a product liable under the Act be the mass, indiscriminate infringing
redistribution of copyrighted works, that the commercial viability of the product
be dependant on revenue derived from piracy, and that the software distributor
had undertaken conscious, recurring, persistent and deliberate acts to encourage
copyright infringement. Id. See also Letter to Senators Frist, Daschle, Hatch,
and Leahy on the markup of S. 2560, September 28, 2004, available at,
http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/POLICY/index.html (last visited March 29,
2005). The signing parties include American Association of Law Libraries,
Association of Research Libraries, Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Consumer Electronics Retailers Coalition, Digital Future Coalition,
MCI, SBC, U.S. Internet Service Provider Association, Verizon, American
Library Association, BellSouth Corporation, Consumer Electronics Association,
DigitalConsumer.org, Home Recording Rights Coalition, Public Knowledge,
U.S. Internet Industry Association, and U.S. Telecomm Association.
200. See New Draft of IICA Released, September 2, 2004, available at
http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/2004/09/new-draft-of-iica-released.htm (last
visited March 29, 2005).
198 [Vol. XV: 167
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to cause or persuade another person or persons to commit any
infringement under subsection (a) of this section.""2 It then listed
several specific actions that could constitute an "overt act 2 2 and
several specific actions that would not constitute "overt acts."2 3
201. Id.
202. Id. It listed the following actions as constituting overt acts:
(A) distributing any dissemination technology that, when used
as intended, automatically causes the user of the technology to
infringe copyrighted works without the user making a
specific, informed decision, for each copyrighted work at
issue, about whether to engage in such infringement;
(B) actively interfering with copyright holders' efforts to
detect infringing uses of dissemination technology and
enforce their copyright against those uses;
(C) offering an incentive to users of dissemination technology
to make infringing use of the technology, such as providing
improved performance of the technology in exchange for
infringing distribution of copyrighted works;
(D) failing to take reasonably available corrective measures to
prevent any continuing acts of infringement resulting from
overt acts described in subparagraphs (A)-(C) of this
subsection (2) that were committed before the effective date
of this subsection; or
(E) distributing a dissemination technology as part of an
enterprise that substantially relies on the infringing acts of
others for its commercial viability or the revenues of which
are predominantly derived from the infringing acts of others.
Id.
203. Id. It listed the following as acts that do not constitute over acts:
(A) distributing any dissemination technology capable of
substantial noninfringing uses knowing that it can be used for
infringing purposes, so long as that technology is not designed
to be used for infringing purposes;
(B) distributing any dissemination technology that
incorporates reasonably effective measures to prevent or halt
dissemination that constitutes infringement within the
33
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This draft was also met with opposition, however.2°" Interested
parties also met with the sponsors of the bill to work on creating a
bill that meets Senator Hatch's stated goals, without harming
legitimate technology industries." 5  The meetings were
meaning of this subsection;
(C) advertising, marketing, or promoting a dissemination
technology that does not specifically encourage the use of that
technology for infringing purposes;
(D) the providing of information on the use of a dissemination
technology by the creator or distributor of that dissemination
technology when the information does not specifically
encourage the use of that technology for infringing purposes,
including through instruction manuals, handbooks, user
guides or customer support services;
(E) the providing of information on the use of a dissemination
technology by a person not affiliated with the creator or
distributor of that dissemination technology in the context of
commentary, criticism, or reviews of the dissemination
technology; or
(F) providing products or services to a distributor of
dissemination technology in the same manner that such
products or services are provided to other members of the
public, including but not limited to financial services, delivery
services, advertising services, product reviews or evaluations,
library services, real estate services, customer-support
services for users of computer software or hardware, utilities
and telecommunications services.
Id.
204. See Letter from Glen Tenney, Chair, IEEE USA Intellectual Property
Committee to Jule L. Sigall, Associate Register for Policy and International
Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office, September 4, 2004, available at
http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/POLICY/index.html (last visited March 29,
2005).
205. See Letter from the Consumer Electronics Association, IEEE-USA, and
NetCoalition, to Senators Hatch and Leahy, October 6, 2004, available at
http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/POLICY/index.html (last visited March 29,
2005).
200 [Vol. XV: 167
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unsuccessful in reaching this aim however, and technology
industries continued to oppose S. 2560.206 Despite these draft
proposals and suggestions, Senator Hatch did not officially amend
his version of the bill. No further action has been taken on the bill.
IV. ANALYSIS
Senate Bill 2560 is a full attack on Sony and its substantial
noninfringing use rule. If it is passed, it will affect twenty years of
precedent. Senator Hatch's statements make clear, however, that
the sole purpose of the bill is to prevent p2p file-sharing services
like the defendants in Grokster from providing easy and enticing
means for the unaware public to violate copyright laws. Senate
Bill 2560 is therefore a very broad sweeping law intended to
address a very narrow issue. In this analysis section, I will first
demonstrate that Senator Hatch's bill would affect the holding in
Sony, despite his statements that it will affect the holdings in
Napster and Grokster while preserving the holding in Sony. I will
then critique Senate Bill 2560 both on its face and in the context of
promoting Senator Hatch's concerns and the Constitutional
purposes of Copyright Law. Finally, I will voice my support for
an educational public campaign in place of Senate Bill 2560.
206. See id. (stating that, "notwithstanding everyone's hard work and good
intentions, we find ourselves further apart now than at the outset of this
process"). See also Letter to Senators Frist, Daschle, Hatch, and Leahy on the
markup of S. 2560, September 28, 2004, available at,
http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/POLICY/index.html (last visited March 29,
2005) (expressing concerns with the most recent draft of the bill and stating that
the bill "is not ready for passage out of the Judiciary Committee"). Fifty entities
signed the letter, including American Association of Law Libraries, Association
of Research Libraries, Computer & Communications Industry Association,
Consumer Electronics Retailers Coalition, Digital Future Coalition, MCI, SBC,
U.S. Internet Service Provider Association, Verizon, American Library
Association, BellSouth Corporation, Consumer Electronics Association,
National Taxpayers Union, Home Recording Rights Coalition, Public
Knowledge, Information Technology Association of America, and U.S.
Telecomm Association. Id.
2004]
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A. The Bill's Effect on the Law
Despite Senator Hatch's statements to the contrary, Senate Bill
2560 will affect not only the precedents in Napster and Grokster
but also the last twenty years of contributory infringement doctrine
initiated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony.
1. Senator Hatch Expressed That S. 2560 Would Affect the
Holding in Grokster
Senator Hatch's expressed concern is with the factual
determinations made in one case - Grokster. He disagrees with
the outcome in favor of the defendants. He explained, "[t]his bill
will protect American artists, children and taxpayers by restoring
the privately funded civil remedy crippled by the Grokster
ruling.""2 7 His concern is that Napster imposed liability upon a
distributor of copying devices, and Grokster did not.2"8
2. If S. 2560 Affects Napster and Grokster, It Also Affects Sony
Senator Hatch stated that "this bill will... preserve the Sony
ruling without reversing, abrogating or limiting it."2 9 However,
Grokster, which Senator Hatch claimed to be affecting, merely
applied the substantial noninfringing use rule in Sony."'° Senator
Hatch attempted to explain this inconsistency by stating, "in cases
like Napster and Grokster, lower courts misapplied the substantial
noninfringing use limitation. These cases forgot about the
'balance' and held that this limitation radically alters secondary
liability. These cases retained secondary liability's control prong
but collapsed its inducement prong." ''"
These statements are inaccurate, however. First, if any court
collapsed the traditional contributory infringement test, it was
207. See Hatch, supra note 3.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162-64.
211. Hatch, supra note 3.
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Sony. Under the traditional test, the two prongs are the knowledge
prong and the substantial participation prong, not the control prong
and the inducement prong.2 2  A plaintiff can establish the
participation prong by showing that the defendant induced, caused,
or materially contributed to the infringement.213 Sony, not Napster
and Grokster, introduced the substantial noninfringing use rule,214
altering the traditional test to make it more difficult to establish a
cause of action against a product distributor than against a
traditional defendant. It was also Sony that radically altered the
application of secondary liability to a product by holding that the
manufacture of the VTR did not constitute contributory
infringement because it had substantial noninfringing uses.215 The
Supreme Court ended the analysis there. It did not go on to
explicitly consider whether Sony had constructive or actual
knowledge of infringement or whether Sony substantially
participated in infringement.
Even Sony did not completely collapse the traditional test,
however. It simply adapted it in cases involving products and
services in light of the fact that these cases involved a multitude of
users from the general public who were not all using the products
and services for the same purpose.216 Essentially, the substantial
noninfringing use rule is a means to determine knowledge and to
balance it with a public interest in preserving legitimate
noninfringing use."' 7 If the traditional test were applied to products
and services without a substantial noninfringing use rule, any
product or service that provided the means to infringe would
constitute contributory infringement, regardless of whether it also
212. See, e.g., Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. at 933.
213. Id.
214. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
215. Id. at 456.
216. See generally Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
217. Id. The Court explained that the contributory infringement doctrine in
the context of products that make duplication possible "must strike a balance
between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective - not merely
symbolic - protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely
to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce." Id.
2004] 203
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had legitimate functions. This could include any product or
service that allowed for the copying, distribution, performance or
display of literature, music, art, or any other work protected by
Copyright law.218
Second, the court in Napster not only maintained the balance
that Senator Hatch claims it forgot about, but it also helped to tip
the balance in favor of the plaintiff. If the traditional structure of
contributory infringement analysis was lost in Sony, it was
reintroduced in Netcom and Napster.2 9 Netcom and Napster
suggested that the Sony substantial noninfringing use rule is used
218. See 17 U.S.C § 106 (2005).
[T]he owner of copyright.. .has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
219. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373, 1375; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020,
1022.
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to determine whether a plaintiff must show constructive or actual
knowledge to satisfy the knowledge prong.2 ° If an Internet service
is found to have substantial noninfringing uses and actual
knowledge of specific infringing files, the Netcom test is used to
determine substantial participation."'
By allowing a cause of action under either the Sony test or the
Netcom test, Netcom and Napster also made it easier for a plaintiff
to establish contributory infringement. Napster upheld Sony's
substantial noninfringing use rule and applied it to find that the
Napster service was likely at least capable of substantial
noninfringing uses."2 Under a pure Sony analysis, this finding
would have ended the analysis. The court in Napster, however,
applied the Netcom test,223 which provided an additional means for
a plaintiff to establish contributory infringement against a
service."' Under the Netcom test, even if a service is found to
220. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374 (holding that "it is beyond the ability
of a BBS operator to quickly and fairly determine when a use is not
infringement where there is at least a colorable claim of fair use" and therefore
that "where a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of infringement
... the operator's lack of knowledge will be found reasonable"); Napster, 239
F.3d at 1020-21.
We are bound to follow Sony, and will not impute the
requisite level of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-
to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe
plaintiffs' copyrights.... [E]vidence of actual knowledge of
specific acts of infringement is required to hold a computer
system operator liable for contributory copyright
infringement.
Id.
221. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374 ("If plaintiffs can prove the
knowledge element, Netcom will be liable for contributory infringement since
its failure to simply cancel [the] infringing message ... constitutes substantial
participation"); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 ("If a computer system operator
learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge
such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct
infringement").
222. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
223. Id. at 1021.
224. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1374-75.
20520041
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have substantial noninfringing uses, a plaintiff can still establish
contributory infringement if the service operator had knowledge of
specific infringement and the ability to prevent or reduce the
infringement, and it failed to do so. 25 The Netcom test only
applies to services with substantial noninfringing uses and actual
knowledge of specific infringing files; it does not preclude or
affect in any way a holding of contributory infringement against a
product or service with no substantial noninfringing uses under the
Sony test.226
Grokster also upheld and followed the Sony precedent. Grokster
produced the outcome it did for two factual reasons: first, it was
found to have substantial noninfringing uses; and second, it was
found to be a product of which the defendant had no control once
it was distributed, like the VTR in Sony."' Grokster did not
significantly change contributory infringement law. It merely
applied the test set forth in Sony2. that the distribution of a product
will not be found to be contributory infringement if the product has
substantial noninfringing uses.29 The court in Grokster found that
the software at issue had substantial noninfringing uses, and
therefore it dismissed the action.23°
3. How Senate Bill 2560 Would Affect the Holding in Sony
Contrary to his statements, Senate Bill 2560 is a full attack on
the contributory infringement precedent set in Sony and followed
for the last twenty years. The bill would erase the distinctions
225. Id. See also Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021. The court in Napster clearly
defined the test that was implied in Netcom, holding "if a computer system
operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails
to purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to
direct infringement." Id.
226. See, e.g., Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653 (holding that the plaintiff was likely
to prevail against Aimster, a service, because the defendant failed to
demonstrate substantial noninfringing use).
227. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161-63.
228. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
229. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162, 1164.
230. Id. at 1162.
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made between traditional defendants, products, and services in
Sony, Netcom, and Napster. It would eliminate the balancing test
created and applied in Sony to preserve the interests in legitimate
uses of products and services. It would create an additional means
for a plaintiff to establish contributory infringement, to be applied
when the plaintiff fails under all of the other tests. And, despite
Senator Hatch's statements, this test is not limited to specific
technology, specific circumstances, or specific extremes. The text
of the law does not define its boundaries. Contributory
infringement is applied across the board to any traditional
defendant, product or service that exemplifies one element - intent
to induce infringement - regardless of whether the defendant also
exemplifies intent to induce other legitimate noninfringing uses."'
It is Senator Hatch, not the courts, who is forgetting the balance.
He has no concern for the interests that the Supreme Court sought
to preserve in Sony by setting the substantial noninfringing use
rule.23
2
B. The Analogy to Criminal Law
Senator Hatch promoted the use of intent to establish
contributory infringement by making a comparison to criminal
law.233 He quoted the following provisions of the Criminal Code:
Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,
or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal .... Whoever willfully causes an act to be
done which if directly performed by him or another
would be an offense against the United States, is
231. See S. 2560, supra note 3.
232. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (explaining that the purpose of the substantial
noninfringing use rule is to "strike a balance between a copyright holder's
legitimate demand for effective - not merely symbolic - protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce").
233. See Hatch, supra note 3.
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punishable as a principal."'
Senator Hatch suggested that Copyright law should not be any
different.2 ' There are flaws with this analogy, however.
First, contrary to Senator Hatch's statement, even Criminal Law
utilizes a rule similar to the substantial noninfringing use rule.
Senator Hatch stated that "Laws imposing secondary criminal
liability have something in common: Congress codified no
exceptions for 'substantial non-criminal uses."' Senator Hatch
was correct that Congress has not explicitly codified exceptions in
criminal complicity or conspiracy for substantial noncriminal uses.
However, this factor is often applied by criminal courts to
determine whether the alleged conspirator had the requisite
intent.23 6 A California court in People v. Lauria, for example, held
that the operator of a telephone answering service used for
prostitution was not guilty of conspiracy, even though the operator
had knowledge of such use, had assisted in keeping the practice
discreet, and had encouraged the activity by promising such
discretion to new customers. 37 The court's reasoning in part was
that a telephone answering service is not inherently susceptible to
illegal use and has other legitimate uses.238 Therefore, although
criminal courts do use intent to determine complicity, they apply a
test to determine such intent that is similar to that applied in
contributory infringement cases. If a test such as that suggested by
Senator Hatch were applied in criminal law, manufacturers of
234. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2).
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal Ct. App. 1967);
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943); United States v.
Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), affid, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
237. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 631 (citing Falcone, 311 U.S. 205\, in which the
Court held that the sale of large quantities of sugar, yeast, and cans to distillers,
with knowledge that they were to be used in a moonshining conspiracy, did not
constitute participation in the conspiracy).
238. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (citing People v. McLaughlin, 111 Cal.
App. 2d 781 (1952) (upholding a conspiracy conviction against the suppliers of
horse-racing information for bookmaking purposes, because there was no legal
use for the information)).
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every weapon would be accomplices, regardless of whether those
weapons could also be used in self defense, in a recreational sport,
as a police enforcement tool, or to carve a Thanksgiving turkey.
Second, and most importantly, criminal law and copyright law
exist to serve very different policies. The criminal law serves to
punish and prevent conduct that threatens harm to individuals or to
the public, to control persons who are disposed to commit crimes,
and to do so in a manner that is fair and just.23 9 In passing criminal
laws, legislatures must attempt to balance the rights of individuals
to be safe against the rights of the accused not to be falsely
accused or inappropriately punished. Both sides of the scale are
extremely heavy, and tipping it in the wrong direction can have
grave consequences. If criminal complicity laws make it too
difficult to find a person guilty of aiding or abetting in the
commission of a crime, they could cause an increase in the
commission of crimes and invade the rights of innocent individuals
not to be victims of such crimes. On the other hand, if the scales
tip too far against the defendant, innocent individuals may be
found to be accomplices of crimes. It is therefore important for
criminal courts to look to the intent and specific conduct of the
defendant in aiding in the crime as well as the harm or potential
harm to victims as a result of the defendant's conduct 4.2 0 Although
the degree that the defendant's assistance or service benefits the
public can sometimes be a factor, the furtherance of such
assistance is not the primary purpose of Criminal Law.
In contrast, the purpose of copyright law is to promote the
arts. 41 The only purposes this must be balanced against are the
239. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (2001).
240. See generally People v. Swain, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
1996); Commonwealth v. Azim, 459 A.2d 1244 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1983).
241. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power.. .to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."). See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975). Justice Stewart stated in the majority opinion:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation [in the form of a copyright] must ultimately serve
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
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promotion of the sciences and other constitutional aims, such as
the First Amendment.242 Congress and the courts therefore do not
have to consider harm to artists beyond its effect on the arts and
sciences.243 Unlike criminal law, the primary concern of copyright
law does not relate to the rights of the "victims" or the
"perpetrators" of copyright infringement. It rather relates to the
affect that statutes and holdings in copyright law have on the
public's right to benefit from the arts and sciences. In the context
of secondary liability, Congress and the courts should look to the
degree that the alleged assistance harms the arts and weigh that
against the degree that suppression of the assistance would harm
the arts and sciences. Of less importance is the financial harm to
the specific plaintiffs and defendants.
A test for secondary copyright liability based purely on intent
would place too much focus on the specific defendants and not
enough focus on the product or service at issue and its affects on
music, and the other arts... 'The sole interest of the United
States [in granting copyrights] and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors.'
Id. (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)), quoted in
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 731-32
(1984).
242. See Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1377. The court exemplifies this
balance by explaining that "The copyright concepts of the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use defense balance the important First Amendment
rights with the constitutional authority for 'promot[ing] the progress of science
and useful arts." It then applies this concept to the context at issue: "If Usenet
servers were responsible for screening all messages coming through their
systems, this could have a serious chilling effect on what some say may turn out
to be the best public forum for free speech yet devised." Id.
243. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., (1909). The judiciary committee
of the House of Representatives explained in 1909 that copyright legislation "is
not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings." Id. It then
set forth two questions that Congress must consider in passing laws: "how much
will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public?" and "how
much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?" Id., quoted in
Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
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the arts and sciences. The tests developed in Sony?44 , Netcom 24 ,
Napste2 46, Aimster2 4', and Grokster 48, however, clearly place more
focus on the primary concerns of copyright law. The substantial
noninfringing use rule, as it is applied in all of these cases, looks to
the degree that the product or service at issue has legitimate uses
that promote the progress of science, technology, or the arts.24 9 It
then weighs this against potential harm to the arts by precluding
from consideration any uses that constitute copyright
infringement."' The additional test applied to services in
Netcom25 1 , Napster,252 and Aimster53 adds further weight to the
prevention of harm to the arts by requiring that such services take
action to prevent or reduce infringement (harm to the arts), to the
extent that they are able to do so, to avoid liability. 4 These tests
are clearly more properly focused on the underlying Constitutional
policies of Copyright law than Senator Hatch's proposed test based
244. Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
245. Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. 1361.
246. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
247. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651.
248. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162.
249. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
250. Id. The majority opinion justifies the substantial noninfringing use rule
by explaining that contributory infringement doctrine, as it is applied to
products and activities that make duplication possible, "must strike a balance
between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective ... protection of
the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce." Id. It also stresses consideration that the
monopoly privileges "are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a
special benefit" but rather "a means by which an important public purpose may
be achieved." Id.
251. Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
252. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
253. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648-49. The court in this case added the
requirement that the cost and burden of the prevention of infringement by the
particular defendant be considered before finding contributory infringement
under the Netcom test. Id. at 648. It justified this addition by explaining that
requiring a service provider to prevent infringement at all costs could result in
the shutting down of legitimate services by the copyright owners "contrary to
the clear import of the Sony decision." Id.
254. See id.
2004]
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merely on intent.
Therefore, because the purposes of Copyright Law are so
different from the purposes of Criminal Law, secondary copyright
liability statutes should not be modeled after criminal complicity
codes. Despite these differing purposes, however, even Criminal
Law uses a substantial noncriminal use test in determining
complicity where a product or service is at issue. 55 This is clearly
the most effective test to address Copyright Law's policies in the
context of alleged contributory infringement by a product or
service, because it focuses on the product's benefit or harm to the
public rather than on the good or bad faith of the alleged
contributory infringer.
C. The Problem with Intent
The previous section established that a cause of action for
contributory copyright infringement based solely on intent is not
the best means to address the underlying policies of copyright law
- to promote the arts and sciences. There are additional flaws with
the use of intent without other factors to support it, especially in
the context of Senator Hatch's bill. First, an intent test without
further guidance encourages abuse and unpredictable outcomes.256
Senate Bill 2560 states that intent can be found from the
surrounding circumstances, even where there is no actual proof of
intent to infringe. A fact-finder could therefore find intent based
on any number of factors evidencing that the distributor of a
product or service may have intended for people to use it to
infringe. Such unpredictability encourages frivolous litigation. It
would also increase the already-great risk of manufacturing and
marketing a new technology. This increased risk could suppress
the development of new technology and investment in technology
255. See Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
256. See PROTECTING INNOVATION AND ART WHILE PREVENTING PIRACY:
HEARING ON S. 2560 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 108th
Cong., 2-3 (2004) (statement of Gary Shapiro, President and CEO, Consumer
Electronics Associations). Shapiro expressed that the law would be "potentially
ruinous to innovation and investment" because of its unpredictability. Id.
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that is developed. This suppression again defeats the
constitutional purpose to promote the arts and sciences.
The use of intent is also problematic because an entity,
especially a large corporation consisting of many minds, may have
more than one purpose in creating and distributing a product or
service. Senator Hatch did not make clear in his bill whether
intent to induce infringement must be the sole intent, or a primary
intent, or merely a thought in the back of someone's mind.257
Sony, for example, probably considered that the potential use of its
VTR to create libraries of infringing tapes, in addition to its other
uses, would help to sell their product.258 If this were true, Sony
had intent to induce some infringement and intent to induce
noninfringing uses.259 While the Court's substantial noninfringing
use rule took this into consideration, the fact-finders applying
Senator Hatch's intent test may not. Intent, therefore, is not likely
to be a successful test for determining contributory infringement
accurately, fairly, and in accordance with the Constitutional
purposes of Copyright Law.
D. Structural Problems
In addition to the other more substantive problems with Senate
Bill 2560, the bill was not very well drafted to meet either the
purposes of copyright law or Senator Hatch's expressed concern.
First, it is very vague. It does not establish any guidelines for fact-
finders to apply the test and for product distributors to comply with
the law. ° This again encourages abuse and increased risk due to
unpredictability. Senator Hatch merely gave an example as to
what could be evidence of intent,261 but he did not explicitly
257. See S. 2560, supra note 3.
258. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
259. See id.
260. See S. 2560, supra note 3.
261. Id. The bill provides that the question of whether a product relies on
infringement for its commercial viability can be taken into account in
determining intent. Id.
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specify a reliable test for determining intent.262
Second, the law is underinclusive and overinclusive in its
relation to both the purposes of Copyright Law and Senator
Hatch's stated purposes. The Constitution granted Congress the
right to pass laws to promote the progress of the arts and
sciences. 63 Senate Bill 2560 is overinclusive of this aim, however,
because a court could find intent to induce infringement where a
product or service does not actually harm the promotion of the arts
and sciences, or even where it promotes the arts and sciences. The
product distributor may exhibit intent to induce infringement, but
the infringement does not actually occur, or it occurs in a way that
does not harm the arts and sciences. Similarly, the noninfringing
uses of the product may potentially benefit the arts and sciences to
such a degree that they make up for the harm caused by the
infringing uses. The bill is also underinclusive of the
constitutional aims, because a product or service may have the
effect of harming the promotion of arts and sciences where the
distributor did not exhibit intent to induce copyright infringement.
The bill is additionally underinclusive and overinclusive of the
purposes Senator Hatch expressed that he intended the bill to meet.
He is concerned with the music industry's tendency. to sue the
direct infringers, who are sometimes children."6 Senate Bill 2560
does not directly address this issue, however. 65 It does nothing to
preclude or limit such litigation. Instead, it merely rewards the
music industry by giving it another subject of litigation - the
distributors of the products and services which the direct infringers
use to infringe. The bill is therefore underinclusive, as individual
direct infringers may and probably would still be sued for their
conduct. There will always be means for individuals to copy and
distribute copyrighted material, whether it is through recording
devices, electronic bulletin boards, file-sharing services, or an e-
mail account. As long as the laws governing direct copyright
infringement remain the same, the music and movie industries'
262. See id.
263. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
264. See Hatch, supra note 3.
265. See S. 2560, supra note 3.
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ability to sue these individuals will not change.
The bill is also overinclusive to meet the purpose of reducing
litigation against individual direct infringers. Senate bill 2560 is
not limited to p2p file-sharing services that may have contributed
to an increase in litigation of individual direct infringers.2 66 It is
directed at every contributory infringement defendant, regardless
of who the direct infringers are and what assistance they got from
the alleged contributory infringer. It would therefore be applied to
defendants who have no link to Senator Hatch's concern.
E. Better Solutions
There are two potential. solutions to meet Senator Hatch's
concerns without harming the arts and sciences. First, he could
redraft Senate Bill 2560 to include clear, narrow boundaries and
limitations more explicitly aimed at the intended conduct. Second,
Senator Hatch could yield to the courts and allow them to develop
contributory infringement law and its application to new
technologies, as they have been doing for the past twenty years.
He could then address his concerns directly through one of two
avenues: the ability of the music and film industries to sue
"innocent" infringers; or the willingness of the public to infringe.
Senate Bill 2560 would be improved if redrafted with an explicit
definition of intent and clear guidelines for fact finders on what to
look for and how to apply the test. It should also apply only to
defendants who are contributing to Senator Hatch's concerns.
However, even these improvements are not advisable because of
the inherent problems with using intent as a sole element to
determine contributory copyright infringement. If Congress feels
that intent should be considered by the courts, intent could be an
additional factor in the test for determining contributory
infringement.
Although any of these versions would be less harmful than
Senate bill 2560 in its current form, the least intrusive action is to
leave contributory infringement analysis as it is and to let the
266. Id.
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courts decide when it is necessary to adjust it. The courts are
better able to adjust to developing technology on a technology-by-
technology basis and to change the tests as necessary in
accordance with the purposes of Copyright Law. The courts in
Sony, Netcom, and Napster made such adjustments.167 The tests
that have come out of these cases may not be the most reliable
tests for meeting the policies of promoting the development of the
arts and sciences. It is possible that Senator Hatch is correct that
Grokster should have been decided the other way. But, if this is
true, it is merely due to an isolated fact-finding error. The fact-
finder may have been incorrect in that case in finding that Grokster
has substantial noninfringing uses.268  Such errors may
occasionally occur under the current tests. If Grokster misapplied
the substantial noninfringing use rule, it is up to the Supreme
Court to make that determination.
Despite any minor flaws that the current tests may have, they are
far superior to the test proposed by Senator Hatch. Senate Bill
2560 would open the door to potential fact-finding errors and
inconsistencies much more significant and prevalent than those
under the current tests. It is therefore safer for Congress to leave
the current precedent as it is, at least until a better solution comes
about.
If Senator Hatch's primary concern is with the increased
lawsuits against innocent direct infringers, he should address that
issue directly. Rather than addressing it indirectly through
contributory infringement, a better solution is to take action either
to reduce such litigation or to reduce the direct infringement.
Litigation against innocent direct infringers could be reduced
through a law limiting the ability of copyright owners to sue. Such
a law could require plaintiffs in direct infringement cases to
establish that the direct infringers had knowledge that they were
267. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. 1361; Napster,
239 F.3d 1004. See also Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156. The Court explained that
"when technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the
Copyright Act must be construed in light of [the benefit derived by the public]."
Id. quoted in Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
268. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160.
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violating copyright laws or at least that they were copying and
distributing copyrighted works. This solution is preferable to
Senate Bill 2560 because it at least directly addresses the intended
issue without suppressing technology and without affecting
defendants who do not contribute to this concern. It is more likely
to reduce litigation against individual direct infringers who are
unaware of their actions.
This solution does have problems, however. First, it encourages
people to willfully avoid knowledge of Copyright Law. Second,
like Senate Bill 2560, it does not further the underlying policies of
Copyright Law - to promote the arts. If an individual's actions are
harming the arts, they are doing so regardless of whether the
individual has knowledge that such actions constitute
infringement. Despite these problems, this action is a better and
less intrusive solution than Senate bill 2560, because it does not
inhibit the Constitutional purpose of promoting the sciences. It
may be the right solution, therefore, if Congress feels that the
public interest in providing an immediate means of limiting
litigation against "innocent" infringers is strong.
The best solution to reducing such litigation, however, is to
educate the public. Robert Holleyman, President and CEO of the
Business Software Alliance, suggested in his testimony before the
Senate judiciary committee that Congress initiate a mass media
campaign against copyright infringement as it has done in the past
against the use of drugs and tobacco.269 Although this solution
could be expensive and could take a while to take effect, it is the
best solution to meeting both the Constitutional purposes of
promoting the arts and sciences and Senator Hatch's purposes of
reducing litigation against individual direct infringers. If people
are aware of the purposes and beneficial effects of Copyright Law,
they may be more willing to abide by it. Additionally, if they are
aware of what constitutes copyright infringement, they will be
more able to prevent unintentionally infringing. This solution is
also the least harmful, because it does not risk defeating the
269. See PROTECTING INNOVATION, supra note 256 at 2 (testimony of Robert
Holleyman, President, Business Software Alliance).
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Constitutional aims by suppressing technology or the arts.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1984, the Supreme Court set the precedent for what
constitutes contributory copyright infringement by a product.20 It
established that a product distributor cannot be liable for
infringement by its users if the product is capable of substantial
noninfringing uses. This test made it more difficult for a plaintiff
to establish contributory liability against a product distributor than
against a defendant with a more traditional relationship to the
direct infringer. In the twenty years since this holding, federal
courts have applied this test to varying circumstances. In the
context of Internet services, the court in Netcom suggested an
additional test under which a defendant could be liable, even
where the service has substantial noninfringing uses. 27' This test
made it easier for plaintiffs to establish contributory infringement
against service providers than against product distributors.
Applying this test, the courts in Napster and Aimster found the p2p
file-sharing services at issue to be liable for contributory
infringement. However, in August of 2004, the Second Circuit
held in Grokster that the file-sharing software at issue did not
constitute contributory infringement.272 The court applied the Sony
test to find that the software was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses and was actually used for such purposes. 73 It
ended the analysis there, without applying the additional Netcom
test, because it found the software to be a product of which the
defendant had no control once it was distributed, rather than a
service.
Senator Hatch responded to the outcome in Grokster by
proposing Senate Bill 2560, which would allow plaintiffs an
additional means for establishing contributory infringement based
270. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440.
271. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
272. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164.
273. Id. at 1161-62.
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solely on intent.274 Secondary liability could be found based on
this test, even where the plaintiff failed to establish secondary
liability under the other tests.
This test would disregard twenty years of precedent as well as
the Constitutional purposes to promote the progress of the arts and
sciences. It would suppress technology by increasing the risk of
developing technology capable of infringement. It would also
create unpredictable outcomes and an increase in fact-finding
error.
Senator Hatch modeled the use of subjective intent after
criminal complicity and conspiracy codes. The analogy between
secondary copyright liability and criminal complicity does not
work, however, because the purposes of the two fields are so
different. Intent works better in criminal law, because its purposes
focus on individuals - the potential victims and the accused. In
contrast, the purposes of Copyright Law focus on the overall
benefit to the general public. Therefore, a law which focuses on
the intent of the defendant alone, ignoring whether the conduct
benefits or harms the public, is inconsistent with the purposes of
Copyright Law.
The bill was also poorly drafted. It is vague, which further
promotes unpredictability and abuse. It is also both underinclusive
and overinclusive to meet the Constitutional purposes of Copyright
Law and even Senator Hatch's purposes in proposing the bill.
If Senator Hatch is concerned with litigation against direct
infringers who are unaware of their actions, he should address this
problem directly. Addressing it indirectly by changing
contributory infringement doctrine is potentially harmful and is not
the most effective means for achieving his purpose. Instead, the
best solution would be to establish a campaign aimed at making
the public aware of the purposes and effects of Copyright Law and
the conduct that constitutes infringement. This solution would
leave the development of contributory infringement doctrine to the
courts, which can be flexible and timely in reacting to a rapidly
changing area of law. Most importantly, it would comport with
274. See S. 2560, supra note 3.
2192004]
53
Land: The Risks of Using Secondary Liability Legislation as a Means of
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ.ART.&ENT.LAW [Vol.XV: 167
the Constitutional purposes to promote the progress of the arts and
sciences by encouraging compliance with Copyright laws and
respect for the resulting benefits.
Julie Erin Land*
*At the close of the 1 0 8 th Congress, Senate Bill 2560 had not left the Senate.
Therefore, secondary liability law remains unchanged and unaffected by Senator
Hatch's proposals. The tension between the recording and film industries and
technology manufacturers continues to exist, however. The Inducing
Infringement of Copyrights Act is likely only the beginning of a search by
Congress, the courts and interested parties for law and policy that will strike a
balance between art and science.
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